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BACK TO THE FUTURE: HOW FEDERAL
COURTS CREATE A FEDERAL COMMON-
LAW COPYRIGHT THROUGH PERMANENT
INJUNCTIONS PROTECTING FTURE
WORKS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court determines that HBO is entitled to a
permanent injunction against Orth-O-Vision's in-
fringement of all of HBO's ... future copyrighted
works.1
In this seemingly innocuous manner, a federal common-law
copyright was born. Despite a constitutional mandate,2 federal
copyright legislation,3 and case law mandating strict statutory
adherence," the Orth-O-Vision court sought refuge in concepts of
equity to protect future copyright works. Over the past fourteen
years, numerous courts have contributed to the creation of a new
federal common-law copyright through the issuance of permanent
injunctions to protect future works.5 This trend demands atten-
tion, as federal courts continue to issue such injunctions with
increasing frequency. These courts rely on pronouncements of
equity and judicial economy for support,' ignoring statutory limits
1 0rth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672,687,205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
4 Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 454 (1854); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 665 (1834). For further discussion of Stevens and Wheaton, see infra notes 101-110
and accompanying text.
" Generally, a copyright owner brings an action for infringement seeking a permanent
injunction to enjoin infringement of any works it presently owns or may own in the future.
See infra Part H (discussing relevant cases).
6 See, eg., Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. HBO, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("it would
be inequitable to grant the copyright owner partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability without enjoining the infringement of future registered works.*); see also NFL v.
McBee & Bruno's, 621 F. Supp. 880, 887, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 11 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (noting
action for statutory damages, instead of permanent injunction, "would be inadequate as it
would produce a multiplicity of suits"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 792 F.2d 726, 230
325
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and merely citing to a previous decision for support.'
The issuance of permanent injunctions to protect future works,
under the guise of section 502(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, is
instead the creation of a federal common-law copyright. Federal
courts ignore the dictates of what is copyrightable as delineated
in the Copyright Act as well as the requirements of registration
prior to commencing an infringement action 0 and the limitation
of injunctions to protecting a copyright.1"
Furthermore, such a federal common-law copyright is unconstitu-
tional. In protecting future works, which Congress has chosen not
to protect, the courts are usurping congressional power as delineat-
ed in the Copyright Clause. 12  Also, in extending protection to
works that do not exist, federal courts are circumventing the
originality requirement and protecting that which is, by definition,
not a writing.
To examine the concerns these injunctions present, it is
important to understand not only the context in which courts issue
future works injunctions, but also the injunctions themselves. Part
II contains a brief discussion of the relevant case law. Part III
addresses the source of a federal court's authority to issue copyright
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (8th Cir. 1986).
7 In all likelihood, the failure of courts to address the arguments against such injunctions
probably is attributable to counsel's failure to present such arguments.
a 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny court having
jurisdiction under this title may... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as
it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."
' 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that copyright protection subsists
... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression...."
10 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that "no action for infringement
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.*
11 d. § 502(a).
'2 "The Congress shall have Power... to Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the Exclusive Right to Their
respective Writings and Discoveries.' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8. Professor Patterson
observes that:
one must read the passage distributively, recognizing that, as there used,
the word science retains its eighteenth-century meaning of knowledge or
learning'. So read, the copyright portion of the clause grants Congress
the power to promote learning by securing for limited times to authors
the exclusive right to their writings.
L. RAY PATmIRSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERO, THE NATURE OF COPYRIOHT. A LAW OF UsERS'
RIGHTS 48-49 (1991).
326 [Vol. 2:325
2
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss1/9
FEDERAL COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT
injunctions. Although courts have relied almost exclusively on
their inherent power to issue such sweeping injunctions, an
examination of copyright law in conjunction with the nature and
purpose of copyright demonstrates that such authority is purely
statutory. Accordingly, where a court's authority to issue an
injunction is statutory, the copyright injunction should conform to
the rights granted by the statute. The protection of future works,
however, exceeds the scope of federal copyright law because such
works are not fixed when the injunction is granted.13
The next step, taken in Part IV, is to determine whether,
permanent injunctions to protect future works are constitutional in
light of the Copyright Clause. The grant of power to Congress to
enact copyright statues as well as the requirements set forth in the
Copyright Clause 4-- originality,15 limited times, public domain,
and Congressional monopoly of federal copyright law-reveal that
injunctions to protect future works are unconstitutional. By using
their inherent power to grant these injunctions in the name of
judicial economy, federal courts are inadvertently disregarding the
mandates of both the Constitution and Congress.
Because future works injunctions cannot conform to constitution-
al requirements, federal courts should refuse to issue such injunc-
tions in future litigation and, indeed, should modify existing
injunctions. This proposal will not, however, leave a copyright
owner without remedies. Indeed, the arsenal of remedies available
to an owner is a potent one.16 The threat of statutory damages,17
attorney's fees, 8  impoundment," and criminal penalties'
should serve to deter future infringement and to provide protection
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
' Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,362,18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1275 (1991).
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433, 220 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 665 (1984). For a thorough discussion of copyright remedies, see Ralph S. Brown,
Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions, LAW & CONTEWP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at
45.
, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1988).
"Id. § 505. But see generally Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That--The Defendant's Dilemma,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 107, 112 (arguing section 505, as disincentive for
litigation by defendants, prevents demarcation of copyright's limits).
117 U.S.C. § 503 (1988).
=Id. § 506.
1994] 327
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for the constitutional mandate contained in the Copyright Clause
and congressional mandates embodied in the present Copyright
Act. Finally, Part IV concludes with a proposed amendment to the
Copyright Act that would prevent federal courts from issuing
injunctions to protect future works.
II. THE ISSUANCE OF FUTURE WORKS INJUNCTIONS
If a work must be fixed and original in order to be copyright-
able,2" how can a court protect the copyright of a work which is
not fixed? How can a work that does not exist and is not fixed,
therefore not copyrightable, be eligible for protection? And, if the
work is not fixed and not copyrightable, how does a "copyright"
owner22 register' that work before maintaining an action for
infringement? Furthermore, how can a court issue an injunction to
restrain infringement of a work that is not copyrightable, and thus,
not possible to infringe? This section will examine the recent
ability of federal courts to accomplish these seemingly impossible
objectives by issuing permanent copyright injunctions to protect
future works.2'
In 1979, a federal court issued the first copyright injunction
designed to protect future works.' Since then, courts have issued
similar injunctions in eleven other cases. Although the resulting
creation of federal common-law copyright is, in all likelihood,
unintentional, the increased usage of such injunctions emphasizes
the need for federal courts to acknowledge their role in creating
this federal common-law copyright. This section, discussing five of
21 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). For further discussion of copyrightability, see infra notes
122-126 and accompanying text.
n 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]nyone who violates any
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner ... is an infringer of the copyright....'
(emphasis added).
23 Id. § 411(a). For further discussion of this provision, see infra notes 131-134 and
accompanying text.
"Note that, as early as 1907, one federal court refused to issue even a preliminary
injunction to protect future works. See Sweet v. G.W. Bromley & Co., 154 F. 754, 755-56
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907) (refusing to grant preliminary injunction to protect future acts of
infringement on grounds that court cannot "interfere" until work is published and that such
injunction would be "argumentative and inspecific").
"Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. HBO, 474 F. Supp. 672, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
328 [Vol. 2:325
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the eleven cases in which permanent copyright injunctions to
protect future works have been issued, provides the necessary
context for evaluating the limited statutory authority"8 for federal
copyright injunctions and the ensuing violations of the Constitution
and the Copyright Act when courts exceed this authority.
The first case in which a court issued an injunction against
future works, Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office," involved
the failure of an affiliate to compensate a cable network for
reception of its transmissions. Although the plaintiff argued that
the court could not enjoin the infringement of works that had not
been registered,' 8 the court concluded that such an injunction
could issue. Noting that other courts enjoined "as a matter of
equitable discretion, the infringement of works yet unpublished,"
29
the court reasoned that equity dictated "enjoining the infringement
of future registered works,'3 especially where infringement
continued and threats of future infringement existed. Further,
although the opinion is conspicuously silent on the requirement of
fixation for copyrightability' and the requirement that an injunc-
tion issue to protect a copyright,3 2 the court did acknowledge the
power of Congress, and Congress alone, to grant copyrights.'
In the next case to confront this issue, Encyclopaedia Britannica
Educational Corp. v. Crooks,' the copyright owners sought an
" See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697 (1985).
*7 474 F. Supp. 672, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
" Id. at 685. Defendant HBO countercIaimed, among other bases, for violations of the
Copyright Act of 1976. Id. at 680, 685.
' Id. at 686 (emphasis added). This case was decided under the Copyright Act of 1976
so it is especially odd that the court would rely on the pre-Act dividing line of publication for
copyrightability. Yet, the Orth-O-Vision court cited to cases decided under the 1909 Act. Id.
The 1909 Act, predecessor to the 1976 Act, relied on publication rather than fixation and did
not contain the express preemption embodied in section 301 of the 1976 Act. For further
discussion of these provisions, see infra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
* Id. at 686. Some courts phrase the injunction in terms of "future works' while others
utilize "future registered works.' Regardless of word choice, the effect is the
same-protection, under the auspices of federal copyright law, of works that do not exist at
the time the injunction is entered.
3, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
32 Id. § 502(a).
33 Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. HBO, 474 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a more detailed
discussion of Congressional power in the federal copyright domain, see infra notes 142-145
and accompanying text.
84 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1187, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
1994] 329
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injunction "to prevent [copying of] any future copyrighted works
that may be copyrighted... or for which the plaintiff may acquire
the exclusive right of distribution."' Observing that a plaintiff
may obtain a permanent injunction "in a copyright action when
liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing
violations,' the court reasoned that equity mandated the issu-
ance of the future works injunction. 7
Throughout its opinion, the Crooks court failed to address a
number of issues. Silent on the requirements of fixation and
originality for copyrightability in terms of the "future registered
works," the court side-stepped the registration requirement by
taking refuge in equity. Moreover, the Crooks court circumvented
the requirement that an injunction issue to protect a copyright.
Most importantly, however, it ignored the congressional monopoly
of the federal copyright domain.
The Eleventh Circuit contributed to the creation of federal
common-law copyright in Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan.'
When defendant Duncan videotaped and sold a broadcast transmit-
ted by plaintiff, a NBC affiliate, the ensuing litigation lasted three
years and generated five opinions. Despite acknowledging
infringement of the plaintiff's copyright, the district court declined
to enter the injunction sought by the plaintiff--'-"to stop future
' Id. at 1187. The infringing party was the Board of Educational Services for Erie
County, New York (BOCES). Id. at 1159. The plaintiff created educational programs which
were broadcast from a local educational television station. Id. at 1158. BOCES maintained
a videotape library and a duplication system to provide teachers in the school system with
materials taped off-the-air. Id. at 1159.
' Id. at 1187 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963,
976 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
37 Id. at 1187 (relying on Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Carey, 482 F. Supp 1358,
1364 & n.15 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)). Oddly, in determining whether the defendant could be
enjoined from infringing the 126 other works it held, in the absence of evidence that these
works were plaintiffs copyrighted works, the court reasoned that since it could enjoin future
registered works, judicial economy permitted it to enjoin the 126 other works. Id. at 1187-
88.
3 572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983), affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 744 F.2d
1490, 244 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131 (lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985) [WXIA-I];
Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 618 F. Supp. 469,228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd,
792 F.2d 1013, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330 (11th Cir. 1986) (WXIA-II]. As part of its 'news-
clipping' service, defendant videotaped and sold a broadcast transmitted by plaintiff, an NBC
affiliate. 572 F. Supp. at 1189.
330 [Vol. 2:325
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unauthorized copying or sales of copies""--on the grounds that
such an injunction would frustrate "the public interest."' The
court denied plaintiffs request for injunctive relief on First
Amendment grounds.41
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit42 affirmed the finding of
infringement but reversed and remanded on the grounds that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant injunctive
relief." In a footnote," the court responded to the argument
that an injunction could not issue to protect works that had not
been created. Although the court of appeals recognized that "[a]n
injunction against the use of unregistered works would bypass [the
section 411(a)] requirement,"" it reasoned that "the statute [§
502] provides for injunctions to prevent infringement of 'a copy-
right', not necessarily the registered copyright that gave rise to the
infringement action."' Therefore, the district court had the power
to issue a future works injunction. Furthermore, where the
Id. at 1189-90.
4 Id, at 1196.
"' Id. at 1196 (reasoning that plaintiff's destruction of its broadcast videotapes dem-
onstrated its lack of interest in reproducing and distributing videotapes, its intent to
abandon the copyright, and defendant's ability to render First Amendment-based social
benefit through sale of these broadcasts because of plaintiffs destruction). Although the
court did discuss the requirements of fixation for copyrightability and registration for
maintenance of an infringement action, id at 1191, it did not do so in the context of future
broadcasts.
4Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 131 (11th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985) [WXIA-I]; Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 618 F. Supp 469, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 141 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd 792 F.2d 1013,230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 330 (11th Cir.
1986) [WXIA-IU].
3 Id. at 1500.
Id. at 1499 n.17. This infamous footnote served as the basis for other future works
injunctions. See, e.g., Olen Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1349, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1798 (8th Cir. 1994); NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, 792 F.2d 726, 732 n.7 (8th Cir. 1986);
Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips, 718 F. Supp. 939,945,9 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2049 (N.D.
Ga. 1989).
4Pacific & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1499.
' I& (emphasis in original); but cf. New York Times Co. v. Star Co., 195 F. 110, 112-13
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1912) (refusing to issue copyright injunction on grounds that prohibition in
section 12 of 1909 Act [predecessor to section 411(a)] encompasses all suits in equity); see
also Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1922) (relying on
Star Co. principle that provisions regarding availability of injunctive remedy and court's
authority to issue injunction "must be read together"). Thus, as early as 1912, the "a
copyright/the copyright* distinction had been examined and rejected as being inconsistent
with the empowering statutory language.
7
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registered work "and the future works are so closely related, part
of a series of original works created with predictable regularity and
similar format... ,"4 refusing injunctive relief would frustrate the
provision that registration is "not a condition of copyright protec-
tion." Moreover, the court failed to recognize that the right to
a copyright and the right to a remedy for copyright infringement
are two entirely different matters.
Despite its implicit acknowledgement of the originality require-
ment, the Eleventh Circuit did not adhere to this requirement.
Rather than adopting the statutorily mandated approach of
refusing to issue this injunction to protect unregistered unfixed
works, the court instead chose to honor the clarifying language in
section 408."' Although it attempted to circumvent the require-
ment of section 502(a),' the court of appeals failed to recognize
that if a work is not fixed-and a work that does not exist cannot
be fixed-then it is not copyrightable. Thus, regardless of its "a
copyright/the copyright" distinction, this injunction rests upon a
right not available under the federal statute; namely, a federal
common-law copyright.
On remand, the district court51 issued an injunction that
"permanently restrained and enjoined [the defendant] from copying
or selling copies of WXIA-TV's broadcast news programs, in whole
or in part."52 The court of appeals, in affirming the injunction,'
refused to reconsider the defendant's argument that future news
broadcasts could not be protected without a copyright registra-
tion." It did observe, however, that the injunction did not apply
to uncopyrightable material included in the broadcast.'
4 Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1489 n.17 (11th Cir. 1984).
4 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1977)).
17 U.S.C. § 408 (1988).
0 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
" Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 618 F. Supp. 469,471 (N.D. Ga. 1985), affd, 792 F.2d 1013
(11th Cir. 1986).
"ld.
Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 792 F.2d 1013, 1015 (11th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1014.
"Id. In contrast to the courts willingness to protect on the basis of copyright law that
which is uncopyrightable because it is not fixed, the inconsistency of its unwillingness to
include uncopyrightable material within the scope of the injunction is puzzling. Yet, having
made this distinction, the court of appeals could have followed it to its logical conclusion:
The protection of future works cannot be achieved under the auspices of the Copyright Act
[Vol. 2:325332
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The Eleventh Circuit's attempt in CNN v. Video Monitoring
Services of America, Inc., to correct the Pacific & Southern Co.
court's error was rendered moot when the decision was vacated on
procedural grounds. Recognizing the jurisdictional prerequisite of
section 502(a), 7 the court held that to have jurisdiction, a plaintiff
must fulfill the prior registration requirement of section 411(a)."
Furthermore, the court noted that "the scope of the remedy for
copyright infringement is constrained and dictated by the scope of
the copyright claim actually registered." 9
Turning to the issue of copyrightability, the CNN court concluded
that because a future work has not been created, it cannot be
fixed.' Consequently, it is ineligible for copyright protection."1
But, it did not. In failing to do so, the Pacific & Southern Co. court contributed to the
creation of federal common-law copyright.
As early as 1965, the NFL advocated the expansion of injunctions issued pursuant to §
502(a) to encompass future works. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R.
4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 & H.R. 6835 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Ses. 1826 (1965), reprinted in 7 GEORGE S. GROSSMAN,
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1826 (1976) (supplemental statement
of Pete Rozelle, Commissioner, National Football League) (suggesting amendment to
proposed section 502(a) that would encompass infringement of 'future programs). Thus, it
comes as no surprise that the next contribution to federal common-law copyright occurred
in National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, 792 F.2d 726, 732 n.7 (8th Cir. 1986)
(endorsing Pacific & Southern Co. approach of granting future works injunction where works
related as part of series).
w 940 F.2d 1471, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 108, vacated for reh'g en banc, 949 F.2d 378 (11th
Cir. 1991). The defendant had copied and sold transmissions of certain of CNN's programs.
The court prefaced its opinion by commenting [o]ur consideration of [Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural TeL Serv. Co. (citation omitted)] together with other authority in the law of
copyright requires us to reverse the grant of preliminary injunction...." 940 F.2d at 1472.
The order granting the preliminary injunction is not available. See CNN v. Video Monitoring
Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765, 769-770 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (granting stay of plaintiffs
motion for preliminary injunction pending resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss).
5' 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
'CNN, 940 F.2d at 1480.
"Id.
8o Id. Although commentators disagree whether the Eleventh Circuit correctly refused
to issue an injunction, agreement as to the lack of federal statutory copyright protection of
future works prevails. See, e.g., Michael W. Baird, Note, Copyrighting Newscasts: An
Argument for an Open Maret, 3 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA & INTELL PROP. LF. 481, 498-500
(1993) (discussing, with approval, court's reasoning in rejecting protection for future works);
Carlo G. D'Agostino, Comment, Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Systems: Justice
or Injunctive ReliefAgainst Copyright Protection?, 5 DEPAuL BUS. L.J. 335, 352 (1993) ("the
Appellate Court was correct in that future works are not entitled to copyright protection);
Amy A. Davis, Case Comment, Caught in the Crossfire: Cable News Network v. Video
9
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Additionally, because the copyright does not exist, it cannot have
an owner. Thus, if the copyright has no owner, no one can initiate
an infringement action as such actions are limited to copyright
owners.
62
The CNN court also noted that the originality requirement
articulated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service,
Inc. 6  prohibits the reliance upon equity'" in the issuance of
copyright injunctions.' Finally, the issuance of permanent
injunctions to protect future works not only sanctioned the evasion
of the registration requirement intrinsic to the copyright as
monopoly scheme mandated by the Copyright Clause, but also
permitted the extension of copyright protection to works in the
public domain---"an impermissible and significant departure from
existing law.' 6s
Monitoring Services and the Nature of Copyright, 53 01O ST. L.J. 1155, 1176 n.110 (1992)
("apparent that the Constitution does not permit, and the Copyright Act does not provide for,
generic protection for future works").
61 CNN v. Video Monitoring Serve. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1480, vacated for reh'g en
bane, 940 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991).
2 Id. at 1481 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)-(b) (1988)).
a 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991). For discussion of this decision and its
relevance to the issuance of injunctions protecting future works, see infra notes 154-157 and
accompanying text.
Seesupra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing reliance of Orth-O-Vision and
Crooks courts upon equity in issuing injunctions to protect future works).
"CNN, 940 F.2d at 1481.
Id. Relying on this opinion, the district court vacated the injunction issued in Pacific
& Southern Co, Inc. v. Duncan, No. C81-1106-ODE, 1991 WL 323412 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31,
1991). After the CNN decision was vacated on procedural grounds, the Pacific & Southern
Co. court reinstated the injunction. No. C81-1106-ODE, 1991 WL 279410 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5,
1991).
In four other cases, federal courts unwittingly contributed to the creation of federal
common-law copyright. See, eg., Princeton Univ. Press, Inc. v. Michigan Document Serve.,
Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 913, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1405 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (granting
permanent injunction encompassing publisher's 'existing or future copyrighted works),
appeal docketed, No. 94-1778 (6th Cir. July 14, 1994); Princeton Univ. Press, Inc. v. Michigan
Document Serve., Inc., No. 92-CV-71029-DT, 1992 WL 436235, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1863
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 1992) (preliminary injunction); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526,18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting fair use
claim by provider of course packets and issuing permanent injunction to protect publishing
company's future works); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Labus, No. 89-C-797-C, 1990 WL
120642, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1142 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 1990) (issuing permanent injunction
to prevent copyright of plaintiffs future motion pictures on basis of defendant's prior
infringement and accessibility of multiple videocassette recorders); Georgia Television Co.
v. TV News Clips, 718 F. Supp. 939,945,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (granting
334
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Yet, some courts, however, are beginning to recognize that the
federal common-law copyright created by the issuance of injunc-
tions to protect future works may be beyond a court's power. In
modifying a permanent injunction issued in a software infringe-
ment action, 7 the Fifth Circuit' concluded that "[the district
court] lacked the authority to enjoin generically all future modifica-
tions [of the program at issue]."O Furthermore, the Kepner-Tregoe
court interpreted the Copyright Act's preemptive effect to encom-
pass all "legal and equitable rights that fall within the scope of
copyright law."7" Reasoning that "copyright law creates a stand-
ing injunction against works that are substantially similar copies
of protectable portions of copyrighted materials,"71 the court of
appeals concluded that the district court's injunctive power was
limited to future works that were substantially similar to the
copyrighted work at issue.72
Although this decision limits the scope of future works injunc-
tions, it does endorse the issuance of such injunctions. Common
sense dictates that any modification will result in a new copyright.
Despite confining the injunction to modifications of the copyrighted
work, the Kepner-Tregoe court also contributed to the creation of a
permanent injunction to future television broadcasts on basis of Pacific & Southern Co.
court's a copyright/the copyright" distinction), affd without op., 983 F.2d 236 (11th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1068 (1994).
Basic Books, Inc. and Princeton University Press, Inc., two of the more recent cases,
probably will have the greatest impact upon the public. "Course packets" are compilations
of text material selected for student purchase by professors. When a professor wishes to
study a wide array of books or articles in a course, but requiring students to purchase each
source would be prohibitively expensive, the professor designates material for copying. A
duplication business, here Kinko's and Michigan Document Services, copies the material and
binds it, making it available for student purchase. The issuance of these injunctions and the
courts' rejection of fair use claims will have, as anyone who has made copies at Kinko's
recently will know, a profound effect on both the academic community and the public.
' The district court enjoined "Further copying, producing, distributing, and/or selling the
MPR program or any modifications thereof...." Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership Software,
Inc., Civ. A. No. H-90-804, 1992 WL 281474 at *7,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
9, 1992), affd as modified, 12 F.3d 527, 529 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 82 (1994).
12 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 538.
IoId. at 538 n.24. Giving such effect to section 301 would preclude a reliance on equity
in issuing injunctions to protect future works.
711 d. at 538 n.25.
72 id.
1994] 335
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federal common-law copyright, albeit to a lesser degree.7
Perhaps the most notable lesson to be gleaned from examining
the future works injunctions is the inability of courts to appreciate,
and honor, the conception of federal copyright law as a limited
statutory monopoly. 4 Despite the existence of statutory mandates
regarding copyrightability, registration and injunctions, courts
have, in an eagerness to achieve "equitable results," fashioned
remedies that emasculate copyright policy.
III. NATURE OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE COPYRIGHT INJUNCTIONS
The argument that federal courts create federal common-law
copyright when issuing future works injunctions rests upon the
premise that a court's authority to issue copyright injunctions is
wholly statutory. To demonstrate the validity of this premise, one
must examine the nature and purpose of statutory copyright. Such
an examination entails, of necessity, a brief discussion of copyright
history. This historical examination, when taken in conjunction
with the constitutional purpose of copyright, manifests the validity
of this premise.
Prior to examining the history of the American statutory
copyright, it is appropriate to examine the effects of the English
" In the most recent future works case, Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (8th Cir. 1994), the plaintiff appealed denial of a permanent
injunction to prevent future copying of its copyrighted photographs. Although the trial court
refused to issue the injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to present a live
controversy, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded, ordering the trial court to issue the sought-after irjunction.
Relying on § 502(aYs use of "a copyright," the court of appeals observed that injunctive
relief could extend beyond registered copyrights and to copyrights that were not at issue in
the particular litigation. Furthermore, the traditional breadth of copyright injunctions, when
taken in conjunction with the court's ability to frame an injunction that protects "works not
yet in existence," id. at 1349 (citing Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499
n.17 (11th Cir. 1984)), served as the basis for the Eighth Circuit's reasoning. Yet, by
pointing to an ability to protect "future infringement of works owned by the plaintiff but not
in the suit," id. (citing Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 568 (D.C. Cir. 1990)), the
Olan Mills court seems to have relied on inapplicable law. In Walt Disney Co., however, the
broad scope of the injunction was attributable to the defendant's apparent willingness to
infringe the copyrights of other Disney characters. Indeed, a vast expanse separates a
scenario, like in Walt Disney Co., between future infringement of extant works and future
infringement of works not yet in existence, as in Olan Mills Co.
" See infra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 2:325336
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heritage upon American copyright. "The vital fact is that the
stationers' copyright lasted for almost two centuries and clearly
provided the basic legal structure that its successor, the statutory
copyright, inherited and carried forward-first in England, then in
the United States." 75
A. ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY COPYRIGHT
From 1557 to 1710 the Stationers Company effectively controlled,
through monopoly, the printing of books in England."' Although
the Licensing Act of 1662 and its subsequent extensions sanctioned
the Stationers' monopoly of the booktrade, and indeed, made
printing in violation of the Stationers' copyright an offense, the
Statute of Anne" transformed the copyright scheme. First, the
focus of protection shifted from the publisher to the author.8
Second, the statute created a public domain 9 through the require-
ment that a new work be created in order to acquire copyright
protection.s' Third, the limited term of the copyrights ' further
7 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 21.
" For detailed examinations of the Stationers and their copyright, see generally
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3-9 (1966); L. RAY PATTERSON,
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 28-71 (1948) [hereinafter PATTERSON, HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE]; PATTERSON & LINDBER, aupra note 12, at 20-27; Howard B. Abrams, The
Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law
Copyright, 29 WAYNE L REV. 1119, 1135-40 (1983); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and 'the
exclusive Right" of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L 1, 9-14 (1993) [hereinafter Patterson,
"exclusive Right"]; L. Ray Patterson, The Statute of Anne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 223, 234-35 (1966) [hereinafter Patterson, Copyright Misconstrued].
8 Anne, c. 19, § 1 (1710).
, See, e.g., Preamble, 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) ("Whereas printers, booksellers, and other
persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting.. . books and other
writings, without the consent of the authors... to their very great detriment, and too often
to the ruin of them and their families.. . .") (emphasis added); id. § 1 ("the author of any
book or books already printed... shall have the sole right and liberty of printing ... for the
term of one and twenty years) (emphasis added); id. (author of any book or books already
composed, and not printed and published ... shall have the sole liberty of printing and
reprinting... for the term of fourteen years .... ') (emphasis added).
7Patterson, Copyright Misconstrued, supra note 76, at 239.
8 Anne, c. 19, 4 1 (1710).
51The term of protection for previously unpublished works was 14 years. Id. The author,
upon expiration of the original 14 year period, could renew the copyright for an additional
14 year term. Id. Works that had been published prior to the enactment of the statute were
eligible for protection for a term of 21 years. Id.
13
Rosette: Back to the Future: How Federal Courts Create a Federal Common-la
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 1994
J. INTELL. PROP. L.
strengthened the public benefit. By eliminating the perpetual
copyright, the work was accessible to all upon expiration of the
copyright term. Finally, the existence of the statute itself embodied
the assumption that no adequate right existed at common law.8 2
Despite the dramatic transformation the Statute of Anne
engendered, it remained unclear to what extent the statute
encompassed all of "the author's interest in his work after publica-
tion."8s Fifty-six years after the promulgation of the statute,
however, the King's Bench faced this question directly in Millar v.
Taylor." A majority of the judges ruled that the Statute of Anne
did not define the author's copyright. Instead, they concluded that
common law mandated the author's entitlement to a perpetual
copyright despite the existence of the statute.'
Although the decision in Millar was not appealed, the question
of common-law copyright surfaced again in Donaldson v. Becket.
The House of Lords reversed the injunction at issue, overturned
Millar and limited the author's common-law copyright to unpub-
lished works. After publication, the copyright statute provided the
only source of protection. With a terse order "[t]hat the Decree be
reversed without costs of suit,"" the rejection of common-law
copyright in England was complete. This history remains signifi-
cant, however, not only for its role in shaping American statutory
2 Abrams, 8upra note 76, at 1141-42. Furthermore, the statute provided no protection
if the author did not comply with the terms of the statute. PATTERSON, HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 76, at 147.
8 Patterson, Copyright Misconstrued, supra note 76, at 239.
s 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). Andrew Millar purchased the rights to
James Thompson's poem, 'The Seasons," in 1729. Millar complied with the statutory
requirements and utilized the protection provided by the statute for the full term.
Subsequently, Robert Taylor printed the poem. Millar brought the action in 1767. Justice
Willes phrased the questions the action presented as '1st. Whether the copy of a book, or
literary composition, belongs to the author, by common law; 2d. Whether the common law-
right of authors to the copies of their own works is taken away by 8 Ann. c. 19.' 4 Burr. at
2311, 98 Eng. Rep. at 206; see also 4 Burr. at 2336, 98 Eng. Rep. at 219 (Aston, J.) (phrasing
questions as whether author has a common law right, whether act of publishing work 'takes
away" his copyright, and whether author's right 'is taken away from him, or restrained, by
the Statute of Queen Ann*). In other words, the King's Bench addressed the existence of a
common-law copyright and whether this copyright was preempted by the Statute of Anne.
Abrams, aupra, note 76, at 1153.
4 Burr. at 2407, 98 Eng. Rep. at 257.
"17 PARL. Him. ENG. 1003 (1813).
338 [Vol. 2:325
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copyright but also to serve as a reminder of the potential harm that
perpetual common-law copyright engenders. 7
B. AMERICAN HISTORY OF STATUTORY COPYRIGHT
1. Introduction. Because the Copyright Clause" provides
Congress with the authority to promulgate federal copyright law,
any discussion of American copyright must acknowledge the
significance of this explicit grant of congressional power. Moreover,
the Copyright Clause was a limitation on, as well as a grant of,
congressional power. Accordingly, common-law copyright became
a matter of state law whereas statutory copyright became a matter
of federal law. This grant of, and limitation on, congressional
power shaped two later developments-the federal preemption of
copyrights and the statutory focus of American copyright.'e
2. Copyright Acts and Relevant Case Law-Prior to 1976.
Congress modelled the first federal copyright statute, passed in
1790, 9' on the Statute of Anne. Limiting protection to maps,
charts and books,92 the statute provided for fourteen year terms
' PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 29-30.
" 'The Congress shall have power... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (codifying federal preemption of copyright).
A power 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts by
securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries'.
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned... .The States
cannot separately make effectual provision for [the copyright of authors
and the right of useful inventions], and most of them have anticipated
the decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
" See PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 12, at 51 ('The framers ... knew, of course,
that Congress could grant only statutory rights.*); PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
supra note 76, at 194 ('The idea of statutory privilege was obviously in the minds of the
framers, because the clause gave Congress the power to enact a copyright statute.); but see
Abrams, supra note 76, at 1175 ("The constitutional language neither explicitly endorses nor
prohibits common law copyright protection.*) The Supreme Court determined the fate of
American common law copyright in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (5 Pet.) 591 (1833). For
further discussion of this landmark development, see infra notes 103-111 and accompanying
text.
" Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (amended 1802) (repealed 1831).
2Id. § 1.
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of protection to United States citizens and residents, and restricted
renewal terms to authors.' The statute defined copyright in-
fringement to encompass a variety of offenses,4 and provided
protection subject to the fulfillment of various formalities.95
Prior to the 1831 revision of the Copyright Act,' Congress
granted federal courts the power to issue injunctions in actions
concerning copyright.97 The 1831 Act expanded the categories of
copyrightable subject matter" but retained certain formalities
from the 1790 act. 9  Federal courts could grant injunctions
"according to the principles of equity.""°° In construing both the
1819 and 1831 Acts, the Supreme Court observed that "[tihere
being no common law of copyright in this country, whatever rights
are possessed by the proprietor of the copyright must be derived
from some grant thereof, in some act of congress. . . ."1o The
Court concluded that because the 1819 Act did not extend equity
powers to forfeiture,"° the jurisdiction of the court was limited to
powers granted by statute.
3Id.
" Infringement included printing, reprinting or publishing of a copyrighted work,
importing copyrighted works or knowingly selling infringing works and provided for
forfeitures and fines for violations. Id. § 2.
6 Compliance with statutory formalities, deposit of a copy of the work with the clerk of
the district court and delivery of a copy to the Secretary of State, entitled the author to
protection under the statute. Id. §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 124.
'eAct of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (repealed 1870).
'7 Act of Feb. 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481 (1819) (repealed 1870). The statute provided:
[T]he circuit ourts ... shall have original cognisance, as well in equity
as at law, of all actions ... arising under any law of the United States,
granting or confirming to authors ... the exclusive right to their
respective writings ... and upon any bill in equity, filed by any party
aggrieved in any such cases, shall have authority to prevent the ...
violation of the rights of any authors... secured to them by any laws of
the United States, on such terms and conditions as the said courts may
deem fit and reasonable.
Id. at 481-82.
" Protection expanded to encompass musical compositions, prints, cuts, and engravings.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (repealed 1870).
"The prerequisites of registration and deposit with the Secretary of State continued.
Id. § 4, 4 Stat. 437.
o Id. § 9, 4 Stat. at 438.
'0' Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447, 454 (1854).
M2Id. at 455.
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Shortly after Congress passed the 1831 Act, the Supreme Court
issued its first copyright decision, a pronouncement which would
forever shape American copyright law, in Wheaton v. Peters.1"6
Reasoning that a common law copyright after publication would
grant the author a perpetual monopoly, the majority concluded that
the author could not claim such a copyright after publication."°
The Court firmly dispelled any notions about the existence of a
federal common law."0 5 Furthermore, even if a common-law
copyright after publication had existed in England, the Court
concluded that such a right had not been adopted in Pennsylva-
nia.106
After rejecting Wheaton's claim to common-law copyright after
publication on the basis of Pennsylvania law, the Court reasoned
1033 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The action arose when Richard Peters, Henry Wheaton's
successor as reporter for the United States Supreme Court, proposed to publish wihe Cases
Decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, From its organization to the close of
January term 1827." Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional
Perspective of Marshall Court Ascendency, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1365 n.423 (1985).
Because copyright royalties composed a substantial percentage of a reporter's income, Peters'
proposal to condense Wheaton's reports would diminish, if not eliminate, sales of Wheaton's
volumes. PATTERSON, HISTOmCAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 76, at 203-04. Wheaton and his
publisher, Donaldson, brought an action in 1831 on the basis of the Copyright Act and
Pennsylvania common law. Although the Circuit Court of Pennsylvania initially granted
Wheaton an injunction, it later dissolved the injunction on two grounds. Denying the
statutory claim on the basis of Wheaton's failure to comply with the requirement of deposit
with the Secretary of State, Judge Hopkinson rejected Wheaton's common-law claim;
concluding that federal common law did not exist and that the states had not adopted the
claimed English common-law copyright. Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862, 871-72 (No.
17486) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832). Wheaton appealed to the Supreme Court.
104 That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and
may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by
improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise [sic] a profit by its
publication, cannot be doubted; but this is a very different right from
that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the future
publication of the work, after the author shall have published it to the
world.
Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657.
" "It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States .... There is no principle
which pervades the union and has the authority of law, that is not embodied in the
constitution or laws of the union. The common law could be made a part of our federal
system, only by legislative adoption." Id. at 658.
,
06 Id. at 660.
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that because Congress had created the author's right,' °7 the right
must be analyzed under the Copyright Act of 1790. Relying on its
earlier conclusion that Congress had created the copyright, the
Court concluded that not only did Congress have the power to
prescribe conditions for copyright protection,'08 but an author
seeking copyright protection must adhere strictly to the terms of
the statute.'09
Despite the Court's unanimous agreement that judicial opinions
cannot be copyrighted,"1 the Wheaton decision's landmark status
derives from its rejection of a common-law foundation for copyright
protection. Copyright is a creature of statute.' Thus, Congres-
sional action defines an author's rights under copyright.
The 1870 revision expanded the scope of copyrightable subject
matter to include dramatic compositions, photographs or negatives
thereof, painting, drawing, chromo, statue, statuary and "models or
designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts...."112
Moreover, the statute provided that an action for copyright
infringement could not be maintained unless the copy bore a notice
of copyright,"' which could only be obtained upon registra-
tion. 14 Thus, maintenance of an infringement action required
registration of the copyright.
The Copyright Act of 19091" departed substantially from prior
statutes in terms of its scope of protection and the requirements
"7 Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for,
created it. This seems to be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances
under which it was enacted." Id. at 661.
too This right ... does not exist at common law-it originated, if at all,
under the acts of congress. No one can deny that when the legislature are
about to vest an exclusive right in an author or an inventor, they have the
power to prescribe the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed;
and that no one can avail himself of such right who does not substantially
comply with the requisitions of the law.
Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
" Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 665 (1834). The Court remanded the case
with instructions to determine Wheaton's compliance with the requirement that copies be
deposited with the Secretary of State. Id. at 667-68.
110 Id at 668.
m Abrams, supra note 76, at 1185.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (1870) (repealed 1909).
1
" Id. § 97, 16 Stat. at 214.
114 1d
" Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat 1075 (1909) (repealed 1978).
[Vol. 2:325
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for, and methods of, enforcement of this statutory protection.
Section four extended copyright protection to "all the writings of an
author."116  Copyright protection attached upon publication
instead of upon registration. 7 Furthermore, one could not
maintain an action for copyright infringement prior to compliance
with the registration and deposit requirements. l' Submission of
a copyright registration certificate constituted prima facie evidence
of the registration in an infringement action-an incentive for
compliance.1
Although the 1909 Act retained a provision permitting injunc-
tions comparable to previous statutes,120 an additional section
provided that an infringing party "shall be liable [t]o an injunction
restraining such infringement [of the copyright]."12' On its face,
the statute provided that an injunction is available only for a
copyrightable work and that injunction must be directed at
infringement of the copyright at issue.
3. Importance of Early American Copyright Law. The history of
statutory copyright in England and the United States indicates the
rejection of national/federal common-law copyright. As Donaldson
demonstrates, the Statute of Anne, precursor to American copyright
statutes, supplanted the author's common-law copyright.
In the United States, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution
explicitly empowers Congress, not the courts, to promulgate
copyright legislation. And, after Wheaton, a federal common-law
copyright cannot exist. The additional contributions of the Wheaton
Court--copyright as a statutory grant and strict compliance with
congressional conditions placed on copyright protection-underscore
the significance of the recent departures from these principles by
.16 Id. § 4, 35 Stat. at 1076.
"
7 Id. § 10, 35 Stat. at 1078. Section 2 provided that the Act did not "annul or limit the
right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or at equity." Id
§ 2, 35 Stat. at 1076. Taken in conjunction with section 10, the statute created a dual
system of copyright protection-federal statutory protection for published works and state
common-law protection for unpublished works.11 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (1909) (repealed 1978).
11 Id. § 55, 35 Stat. at 1086.
See id. § 36, 35 Stat. at 1084 (granting power "to grant injunctions to prevent and
restrain the violation of any right secured by said laws, according to the course and
principles of courts of equity, on such terms as said court or judge may deem reasonable").
"lId. § 25(a), 35 Stat. at 1081.
1994] 343
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courts that issue permanent injunctions to protect future works.
Furthermore, the provisions of the pre-1976 Copyright Acts
demonstrate the significance placed by Congress on certain
statutory conditions; the requirements of registration prior to
maintaining an infringement action, the limits placed on issuance
of injunctions and the imperative that a work be copyrightable
before it is eligible for statutory protection.
C. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976122
1. Requirements for Copyrightability. Section 102(a)12' of the
Act defines the limits of copyrightability and, consequently,
eligibility for federal statutory protection. The statute provides, in
pertinent part, that "c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 2' A
statutory definition of "fixed" appears in section 101.125
According to the House Report which accompanied the Act,
fixation serves as the boundary between state common law or
statutory protection and federal statutory protection.1 26  Thus,
12 17 U.S.C. f§ 101-810 (1988).
,
21 Id. § 102(a).
12 Id.
Id. § 101. The definition provides:
A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodi-
ment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author,
is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is
being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Id.
no Under the bill, the concept of fixation is important since it not only
determines whether the provisions of the statute apply to a work, but it
also represents the dividing line between common law and statutory
protection... an unfixed work of authorship ... would continue to be
subject to protection under State common law or statute but would not
be eligible for Federal statutory protection under section 102.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C-.AN. 5659,
5665. See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE REG ER OF CoPYRGHTS
[Vol. 2:325
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where a work is not fixed, the provisions of the Copyright Act
simply do not apply; rendering the work ineligible for federal
statutory protection. Consequently, future works, which by virtue
of the fact that they do not exist are not fixed, do not fall within the
purview of statutory protection.
2. Preemption. Congress preempted all state laws equivalent to
copyright in section 301.127 Thus, only works that are "fixed in
a tangible medium of expression" may be protected by the federal
copyright statutes whereas only works that are not fixed may be
protected by state common law or statute. Legislative history
indicates that "a work would obtain statutory protection as soon as
it is 'created' or, as that term is defined in section 101, when it is
'fixed in a copy... for the first time.' "" Therefore, a work that
is not fixed-a future work-cannot obtain statutory protection.1
Protecting future works through permanent injunctions results in
federal common-law copyright; a result seemingly antithetical to
congressional intent."$°
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 41 (Comm. Print.
1961), reprinted in 3 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 41 (observing that "the [revised copyright]
statute would not apply to a work... which the author has not fixed in any tangible form.*)
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (19S8).
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright.., in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium
of expression... are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work
under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id. § 301(a). Congress did provide, however, that "works of authorship not fixed in any
tangible medium of expression' are protectable under state common law or state statute.
Id. § 301(bXl); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (prohibiting
state from using unfair competition law to extend patent-like protection to lamp not
protected by federal law); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)
(noting, in dicta, that state law causes of action outside scope of federal intellectual property
protection not preempted).
'H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126, at 129, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AN. at 5745
(emphasis added).
I See, eg., Dodd v. Fort Smith Special School Dist. No. 100, 666 F. Supp. 1278, 1283,
4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1395 (W.D. Ark. 1987) ("Fixation is now the trigger mechanism which
terminates common law copyright and activates federal statutory copyright") (citation
omitted).
' But cf. Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 903 (1987) (attributing difficulties in interpreting legislative history to fact
Congress "revised the copyright law by encouraging negotiations between interests affected
by copyright, by trusting those negotiations to produce substantive compromises, and by
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3. Registration As a Prerequisite for Maintaining an Infringe-
ment Action. Section 411(a)13 1 carries forward the requirement
in section 12 of the 1909 Act'32 of copyright registration prior to
instituting an action for infringement." Requirements for live
television transmissions appear in section 411(b).' Registration
is a jurisdictional requirement. The only exception is section
411(b)(1) for purposes of obtaining an injunction. This exception
indicates that otherwise injunctions are not available for future
works.
4. Injunctive Remedy. If a copyright owner seeks an injunction
to prevent infringement, section 502(a)'s controls. This provision
grants injunctive power to "[a]ny court having jurisdiction of a civil
action arising under this title... ."13 The court "may... grant
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.) 137
Available legislative history regarding section 502(a) does little to
clarify the power to grant injunctions. The House Report merely
reiterates the court's power to, on the basis of discretion, prevent
ultimately enacting those compromises into law*); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright,
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 278 (1985) (attributing Copyright
Act's failure to accommodate technical change to congressional reliance on industry
representatives for statutory drafting).
. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988).
' Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 230, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078 (1909) (repealed 1978).
u3 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). With the exception of non-U.S. works, "no action for
infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." I&
U4 In the case of a work consisting of sounds, images, or both, the first
fixation of which is made simultaneously with its transmission, the
copyright owner may, either before or after such fixation takes place,
institute an action for infringement under section 501, fully subject to the
remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and sections 509 and 510,
if... the copyright owner-
(1) serves notice upon the infringer, not less than ten or more
than thirty days before such fixation, identifying the work and
the specific time and source of its first transmission, and
declaring an intention to secure copyright in the work; and
(2) makes registration for the work, if required by subsection
(a), within three months after its first transmission.
Id. § 411(b).
u5 Id. § 502(a).
" Id.
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infringement by granting an injunction."" In a study submitted
as part of the copyright revision,'39 the author noted that the
propriety of injunctive remedies for copyright infringement had
gone unquestioned." The primary consideration in issuing
injunctions seems to be whether additional injury to the plaintiff is
likely.141
D. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
Any discussion of the nature and purpose of copyright must begin
with the Copyright Clause. As indicated by the delegation of power
to Congress, 42 copyright is a creature of statute and only
Congress possesses the requisite power to define the scope of
copyright. Indeed, on numerous occasions, courts have emphasized
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126 at 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5776.
SSTAFF OF THE SuBcoMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SEN.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEaS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDY No. 24,
REMEDIES OTHER THAN DAMAGES FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 115 (Comm. Print 1960)
(William S. Strauss), reprinted in 8 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 115.
,,o The permissive nature of this grant of injunctive power "was done advisedly." James
L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies: Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
983, 994 & nn.85-87 (1990). A survey of law review literature regarding copyright
injunctions indicates that approval of this permissive grant arises out of concern about
mandatory injunctions, not the scope of copyright injunctions. Indeed, the primary concern
copyright injunctions engender appears to be the limits such injunctions would place on fair
use. See, e.g., id. at 995-96 (arguing that public interest of access to information through fair
use should be taken into account when courts issue copyright injunctions); Tiffany D. Trunko,
Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First Amendment, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1940, 1956 (1989) (advocating bifurcated approach towards liability and remedy as
means for advancing policies of first amendment and copyright laws); see also infra note 160
(noting implications for fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
141 See, eg., 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B],
at 14-98 to 14-99 (1994) ("] permanent injunction is issued only after liability is established
... Nonetheless, [permanent] injunctive relief ordinarily will not be granted when there is
no probability or threat of continuing or additional infringements.") (citations omitted); 2
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 11.2, at 275 (1989) (noting requirement that plaintiff
demonstrate likelihood of recurrent infringement 'is not particularly rigorouse).1
""Congress shall have Power... ", U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
'" Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 579, 580 (3rd Cir. 1941) ("Copyright... is wholly a creature
of statute.*); see also Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 101 (1965), reprinted in 8 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 101 (statement of John
Schulman, Chairman for Revision of Copyright Law, American Bar Association) ("[T]he basic
rights of the copyright proprietor and his remedies against infringement are only those
provided by statute.').
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the statutory nature of copyright.1" Thus, this delegation of
power constitutes, and defines, the nature of copyright as a
statutory monopoly. Further strengthened by the explicit rejection
of federal common-law copyright in the 1976 copyright revision,
145
federal courts do not possess the authority to create federal
copyright through common law. Therefore, the parameters of the
1976 Copyright Act limit the role of the federal courts in the
copyright arena.
Yet, this statutory monopoly itself contains inherent limits; limits
embodied in the Constitution's grant of power. 4 These lim-
its-promotion of learning,147 protection of the public domain,14
and benefit to the author 49 -represent the policies underlying
American copyright law. Shaped, in part, by English copyright
history, the promotion of these policies serves as the foundation for
American copyright jurisprudence."W
4 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ('As
the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted... ."); Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (-But the copyright is the creature of the federal statute
passed in the exercise of the power vested in Congress. As this Court has repeatedly said,
the Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one.*); Security-First Nat'l
Bank v. Republic Pictures Corp., 97 F. Supp. 360, 365, 89 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231 (S.D. Cal.
1951) (MIt is evident... that copyright is... the creature of statute and possessing only the
characteristics which the statute has endowed it with."), rev'd on other grounds, 197 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1952).
145 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
,Patterson, "exclusive Right*, supra note 76, at 4.
", "To Promote the Progress of Science .... ", U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
'
4 8by securing for limited Times ... *, Id.; see 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary
Property § 1 (1985) ("he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize under the
copyright clause of the Constitution are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide
a special private benefit; rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved."); 1 GOLDsTEIN, aupra note 141, § 1.1, at 5 ("he constitutional
clause empowering Congress to enact a copyright statute reflects the belief that property
rights, properly limited, will serve the general public interest in an abounding national
culture."); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 325 (1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant... copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort is the best way to advance public welfare.
.. '); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,158, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243 (1948)
("The copyright law... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
,"by securing... to Authors... the exclusive Right...', U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. CL 8.
"o As noted by the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1975):
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
348
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IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FEDERAL COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT
A. THE CONSTITUTION
By virtue of the Copyright Clause,""' an analysis of the creation
of federal common-law copyright through the issuance of injunc-
tions to protect future works must begin with constitutional
considerations. The creation of this federal common-law copyright
is unconstitutional in five aspects. First, the protection of that
which is not created defies the originality requirement articulated
in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.152
Second, extending copyright protection to works which do not exist
emasculates the limitation of protection to authors. Third, this
expansion circumvents the "writings" requirement. By definition,
a work that has not been created cannot be a writing. Fourth,
federal common-law copyright protection evades the "limited times"
requirement. Finally, the formulation of rights by common law
the 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive,
to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. 'he sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.'
(citation omitted). See also Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 823, 829,
28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (10th Cir. 1993) (MCopyright policy is meant to balance protection,
which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors and inventors and thereby to establish
incentives for development, with dissemination, which seeks to foster learning, progress and
development.'). In United States v. Billy, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 717
(E.D. Pa. 1975), the court characterized copyright law as:
a compromise between competing social policies-one favoring the widest
possible dissemination of new ideas and new forms of expression, and the
other giving writers and artists enough of a monopoly over their works
to ensure their receipt of fair material rewards for their efforts. The first
policy predominates, which means that the system of rewards is to be no
more extensive than necessary in the long run to elicit a socially optimal
amount of creative activity.
See also CNN v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478, vacated fbr
rehearing en bane, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing copyright as bargain in which
authors receive exclusive right to reproduce, for limited time, their writings in exchange for
author's dissemination to public to facilitate learning).
" "The Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.* U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cI. 8.
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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that are not protected by statute usurps congressional control of
copyright law."a
"The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author."'"
Common sense dictates that it is impossible to ascertain the
originality of that which does not exist. Thus, by extending
copyright protection to future works through injunctions, courts
disregard this fundamental requirement." s  Because "[t]he
originality requirement is constitutionally mandated for all
works,""  the refusal to adhere to this requirement, evidenced
through protection to future works, fails to satisfy the constitution-
al mandate; rendering the creation of federal common-law copyright
unconstitutional.'57
Furthermore, " 'an author', in a constitutional sense, [means] 'he
to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.' "" A work
that does not exist has neither an origin nor an originator. But, by
protecting future works, courts that issue such injunctions frustrate
"
5 Arguably, permanent injunctions to protect future works operate as prior restraints.
See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931) (striking down prior restraint on
publication as violation of press freedom). In extending copyright protection to future works,
a court is effectively exercising broad control over a defendant's expression prior to the
manifestation of a copyrightable expression. A more detailed discussion of this problem,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. But see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 141 §
14.06[C], at 14-102 to 14-104 (observing that, although injunctive scope should be
"coterminous with ... infringement," injunctive remedy could, if exercised broadly, "alter
copyright into an engine of suppression, in contravention of its goal to promote the progress
of science and threatening to encroach on First Amendment values*).
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
Courts that grant these injunctions on the basis of equity are, instead, relying on the
.sweat-of-the-brow" theory that the Feist decision explicitly rejected. CNN, 940 F.2d at 1481
(citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 351-59).
'NFeist, 499 U.S. at 347 (quoting L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law:
The Scope of Copyright Protection for Lw Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989)).
" As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in CNN, the future works
injunctions may have the effect of permitting copyright owners to gain protection for "public
domain materials, an impermissible and significant departure from existing law." CNN v.
Video Monitoring Serva. of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1481, vacated for rehg en bane, 949 F.2d
378 (11th Cir. 1991).
'" Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (quoting
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). See also 1 NIMMER &
Niam , supra note 141 § 2.01[A], at 2-9 ("Originality means ... that the work owes its
origin to the author, i.e., is independently created and not copied from other works.").
350
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both the explicit constitutional requirement of an "author" and the
originality requirement implicit in the term "author."
The protection of future works exceeds the constitutional
limitation of copyright protection to "Writings." Not only must an
indispensable originality exist in a writing,15 but the actual
requirement also must be satisfied." ° A work that does not exist
is neither a writing nor can it, until it exists, satisfy the originality
requirement.
Additionally, the protection extended to future works is potential-
ly limitless in duration. Although the statutory term will attach
upon fixation, it is possible that the combination of pre- and post-
fixation lengths of protection could exceed that afforded by statute.
It is in this respect that courts which issue such injunctions exceed
the constitutional requirement of "securing for Limited Times."
16
'
Moreover, Congress premised enactment of section 301 upon
effectuating compliance with this constitutional mandate."6 2
' Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
1 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Subject Matter of Copyright Under the Act of 1976,
24 U.C.L.A. L REV. 978, 987 (1977) ("Fixation in tangible form is not merely a statutory
condition to copyright. It is also a constitutional necessity. That is, unless a work is reduced
to tangible form, it cannot be regarded as a 'writing' within the meaning of the constitutional
clause authorizing federal copyright legislation.*); see also Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on
the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLuM. L. REV. 503, 504 (1945) (observing that constitutional
requirement of "writings" precludes copyright protection for "ideas still in the author's
head"). It is in this manner that permanent injunctions to protect future works fall afoul of
the idea/expression dichotomy. First articulated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 104.05 (1879), and incorporated into the current statute at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988), this doctrine provides that whereas an idea may not be protected by copyright, the
expression of that idea is clearly eligible for copyright protection. By issuing a future works
injunction, a court protects works that do not exist. Moreover, until that work comes into
being, it is the author's idea that gains protection, in direct contravention of the long-honored
idea/expression dichotomy.
Additionally, the protection of future works through permanent injunctions prevents a
defendant from articulating a fair use claim under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). A thorough
discussion of the fair use implications posed by such injunctions is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
161 See Saul Cohen, Duration, 24 U.C.LA. L. REV. 1180, 1185 (1977) (observing that
because of limited times provision, "from the very beginning copyright protection under
federal law has been and must be for a limited period").
'
62 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126, at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5746 (noting enactment of section 301 'would also implement the 'limited times' provision
of the Constitution); see also REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., lsT SESs., REPORT ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 40 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3
GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 40 (acknowledging perpetual protection accorded under
27
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this federal common- law
copyright protection for future works usurps the congressional
mandate furnished in the Constitution. After all, the Constitution
provides that "Congress shall have power"6 not, "the federal
courts shall have power." An author has no right to protection
where Congress, empowered by the Constitution, has chosen not to
extend it. Also, because copyright is a creature of statute, a court
cannot grant a right to copyright protection that Congress has
declined to create. Furthermore, where Congress has chosen to
extend protection and enforcement of protection subject to condi-
tions such as fixation and registration,'" a court cannot circum-
vent these prerequisites. Indeed, Wheaton v. Peters1" demands
that such conditions be honored through strict compliance. The
Wheaton Court first articulated that American copyright law is the
creation of Congress and Congress alone.'" Congress controls
the monopoly privileges that copyright protection bestows.
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public
purpose is achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors ... by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the
common-law copyright collides with 'limited times' dictate of Constitution). Under common
law, copyright protection is perpetual-inherently not a limited time.
u6 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
'6' See supra, notes 122-141 and accompanying text (discussing statutory prerequisites
in Copyright Act of 1976).
16 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); see supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
*' Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661; see also Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339,
346 (1908) ([C]opyright [protection] under the Federal law is wholly statutory, and depends
upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the authority
conferred under article 1, § 8 of the Federal Constitution.*); Freeman v. Trade-Register, Inc.,
173 F. 419,421 (C.C.W.D. Wa. 1909) (The law of copyright in the United States is entirely
statutory. All the conditions prescribed by Congress are important and essential and must
be observed, or there is no right of action.3 ).
[Vol. 2:325352
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products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control.
167
In short, the creation of federal common-law copyright by courts
that issue permanent injunctions to protect future works subverts
the nature of copyright-a limited statutory monopoly-as it has
existed to date. The sweeping protection these courts provide is
neither limited nor statutory. Clearly, then, this protection is not
constitutional.
B. CONGRESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS
Because "it is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors ... to give the public appropriate access to their work
product,"'" any analysis of this federal common-law copyright
must examine the scope of protection that Congress has granted.
Wheaton v. Peters16 mandates strict compliance with statutory
requirements.
Section 10217' of the Copyright Act provides that "[clopyright
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 171  But what does this provision
mean? According to the House Report issued with the Act, fixation
in tangible form is "a basic condition of copyright protection... an
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984) (emphasis
added). Nine years earlier the Court had emphasized this point in Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (1975):
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts.
Id. at 156 (emphasis added).1 Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429.
16 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
170 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
171 Id.
1994] 353
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unfixed work of authorship .. would not be eligible for Federal
statutory protection under section 102."1'2
Thus, it is clear that if a work is not fixed, it is not copyright-
able. 171 If it is not copyrightable, it cannot be afforded protection
under the federal statutory scheme. 174  Yet, courts that issue
injunctions to protect future works circumvent this basic require-
ment, resulting in the creation of a federal common-law copyright.
Despite the unavailability of protection under the statutory scheme
due to a lack of fixation, the courts that issue these injunctions
take advantage of the remedial provisions.
Section 411(a) mandates the registration of the copyright prior to
instituting an action for infringement."' Requirements for live
television transmissions appear in section 411(b).1 76  This man-
171 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5665.
Professors Nimmer contend that a situation in which an author seeks copyright protection
for an unfixed work could never arise:
Clearly an intellectual creation which is merely in the mind of the author
may not be regarded as property capable of copyright. To state this
proposition, however, amounts to nothing more than an intellectual
exercise since practically there could be no copying (and hence no need
to invoke copyright) of a work which has never been expressed in any
form.
1 NIMMEE & NIMMER, aupra note 141, § 2.02, at 2-18.3.
173 See Ralph S. Brown, Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24
U.C.LJ.L L. REV. 1070, 1105 (1977) ("If a work is not fixed, it is not in federal copyright.').174 See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Engg Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576,
581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (E.D. La. 1991) (noting that ascertaining enforceability of
copyright requires analysis of originality, copyrightability and fulfillment of statutory
formalities).
... 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988). With the exception of non-U.S. works, "no action for
infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of the
copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title." Id.
176 In the case of a work consisting of sounds, images, or beth, the first
fixation of which is made simultaneously with its transmission, the
copyright owner may, either before or after such fixation takes place,
institute an action for infringement under section 501, fully subject to the
remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and sections 509 and 510,
if... the copyright owner-
(1) serves notice upon the infringer, not less than ten or more
than thirty days before such fixation, identifying the work and
the specific time and source of its first transmission, and
declaring an intention to secure copyright in the work; and
(2) makes registration for the work, if required by subsection
(a), within three months after its first transmission.
Id. § 411(b).
354
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date of registration is jurisdictional. 1 7  If the copyright owner
does not satisfy this condition precedent, a court has no jurisdic-
tion, which prevents an infringement action from proceeding. This
jurisdictional prerequisite underscores this creation of federal
common-law copyright. Not only do courts continue an infringe-
ment action but also fashion an injunctive remedy, allegedly on the
basis of the same copyright act which should have prevented the
court from hearing the claim.
17 'Under the bill ... a copyright owner who has not registered his claim can have a
valid cause of action against someone who has infringed his copyright, but he cannot enforce
his rights in the courts until he has made registration." H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126,
at 157, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5773. See also CNN v. Video Monitoring Serve.
of Am., Inc., 940 F.2d 1471, 1480, vacated for rehg en banc, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991)
(observing that § 411(a) requirement must be satisfied before court has jurisdiction over
enforcement action); Quincy Cable Sys., Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 838, 850-51,
1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722 (D. Mass. 1986) ('Although recitation of the fact that copyrights
have been registered appears to be a mere technicality, it is a prerequisite to the court's
jurisdiction.') (citations omitted); Strout Realty, Inc. v. Country 22 Real Estate Corp., 493
F. Supp. 997, 999, 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (W.D. Mo. 1980) ("If plaintiff fails to plead and
prove the fact of registration, then it is not entitled to enforce its rights under the 1976
Act.'); Burns v. Rockwood Distrib. Co., 481 F. Supp. 841,848-49 & n.14, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
713 (N.D. Il. 1979) (dismissing defendants counterclaim for failure to satisfy "the
jurisdictional prerequisites of copyright registration...).
One trial court took a novel approach to the future works injunction dilemma. Olan Mills,
Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 795 F. Supp. 1423, 1429-30, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (N.D. Iowa
1991), reu'd, 23 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1994). Noting that 'a court may issue a declaratory
judgment only when there is an 'actual controversy' between the parties," id. at 1429, the
court observed that the plaintiff could not seek, through a declaratory judgment action, to
protect future copyright works where plaintiff acknowledged it did not register its copyright.
Moreover, the inability of plaintiff to cite authority for permitting a declaratory judgment
action for unregistered works and the absence of 'an independent base for federal
jurisdiction* under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 led to the conclusion that a declaratory judgment would
be inappropriate. Id.
Reversed on appeal, see supra note 73, the trial court raised an interesting point. Because
the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual "cases or controversies",
U.S. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2, this provision provides independent support for arguing that future
works injunctions have no constitutional legitimacy. Where, as noted by the Olan M/Us trial
court, a work does not exist, a court faces an "abstract question 'based upon the possibility
of a factual situation that may never develop.'" Hendrix v. Poonai, 662 F.2d 719, 722 (11th
Cir. 1981). Thus, to assume that a defendant, permanently enjoined from infringing the
work at issue and facing the potential threat of draconian damages, would infringe future
copyrighted works owned by plaintiffs requires a federal court to not only engage in crystal
ball gazing but also to exceed the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction.
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In the past years, however, efforts at repealing section 411 have
been intense.171 Proponents of rescission reason that the current
registration requirement "discriminates against United States
authors, who unlike their foreign counterparts, have to go through
the time and expense of preparing copyright registrations."179
They conclude that elimination of this prerequisite will eradicate
this discrimination, and also will prevent the imposition of
formalities upon American authors by Berne Convention coun-
tries." ° The potential impacts of repealing section 411 include
increased difficulty in ascertaining copyrighted materials, conceiv-
ably creating a multitude of inadvertent infringers. 8 1  Further-
more, as noted by the Librarian of Congress, repeal of section 411
would irreversibly harm the Library's function of facilitating "the
growth and exchange of ideas by making the nation's intellectual
and creative output available for study." 2
Section 502(a)'" grants injunctive power to "[any court having
jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title.... ."'" The
court may... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms
'78 See, eg., 140 CONG REC. H9281, H9282 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (introducing H.R.
4307, Copyright Reform Act of 1993) (repealing § 411(a)); 139 CONG. REC. H10308 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993) (introducing H.R. 897, Copyright Reform Act of 1993); 139 CONG. REC. 81618
(daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (introducing S. 373, Copyright Reform Act of 1993).
1" 139 CONG. REC., supra note 178, at H10310.
1 0 Id.
181 Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The
Importance of Being Formal, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1232, 1254 (1977) (aA more important
function of registration, however, is the maintenance of a complete and accurate public
record of who owns what.').
82 139 CONG. REC. E810, E811 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993) (Statement of James IL
Billington). One recently introduced bill, H.R. 4307, addressed this concern by requiring the
Librarian of Congress to submit, within three years, a report detailing the Acts effects on
"the acquisitions of the Library of Congress.* 140 CONG. REC., supra note 178, at H9283.
See also STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SEN.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDY No. 17,
THE REGISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT 40-45 (Comm. Print 1960) (Benjamin Kaplan), reprinted
in 1 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 40-45 (discussing values of copyright registration); see also
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1st Seas. 56 (1965),
reprinted in 8 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at 56 (statement of Ramsey Clark, Deputy Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice) (questioning "the advisability of permitting an
infringement suit where no registration has occurred').
17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
lB4id
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as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of
a copyright.""' This provision "reasserts the discretionary power
of courts to grant injunctions... to prevent or stop infringements
of copyright."l"e Indeed, "the principles upon which injunctions
are granted or withheld in the field of copyright are those followed
in all other fields of law."187
Accordingly, an examination of another area of the law in which
the court's discretion to issue injunctions has been challenged may
prove fruitful. In two cases involving water law and injunc-
tions,"' the Supreme Court addressed the issue of equitable
discretion in a statutory context. These cases demonstrate the
Supreme Court's unwillingness to issue injunctions that exceed
clearly delineated statutory parameters.
TVA presented the issue of whether completion of the Tellico
Valley Dam should be enjoined to protect the snail darter. Despite
noting that work on the dam was "80% complete" 18 when
litigation commenced, the Court concluded that an injunction was
the appropriate remedy."9 The Court reasoned that "Congress
has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear
that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered
species the highest of priorities."191 Thus, a court could not
perform the routine equitable balancing 1" attendant to issuing
injunctions. Moreover, the Court observed that where "Congress,
exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities
in a given area, it is ... for the courts to enforce them when
enforcement is sought."i9 '
1SId.
sH. REP. No. 1476, supra note 126, at 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5776.
r STAFF OF THE SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, STUDY No. 24: REMEDIES OTHER THAN DAMAGES FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
116 (Comm. Print 1960) (William S. Strauss), reprinted in 3 GROSSMAN, supra note 55, at
116.
' City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
TVA, 437 U.S. at 166.
'"'Id. at 172.
"'Id. at 194.
Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
"'Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 194 (1978).
1994] 357
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In City of Milwaukee,'" the Supreme Court refused to issue an
injunction to prevent discharge of untreated sewage into Lake
Michigan.1 5  By enacting the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972,"0 Congress had preempted the federal
common law of nuisance by occupying the field.197 Accordingly,
the Court rejected reliance "on federal common law 'by judicially
decreeing what accords with common sense and the public weal'
when Congress has addressed the problem."19'
These two decisions, albeit interpreting water law, are instructive
in delineating the limits of a federal court's discretion in issuing
future works injunctions. Where Congress has decided that the
"order of priorities"'" in the copyright arena depends upon
"fixation in any tangible medium of expression,"200 a federal court
cannot exceed these boundaries in the name of equity and judicial
economy. Similar to the eradication of federal common-law of
nuisance in City of Milwaukee, Congress has precluded develop-
ment of federal common-law copyright. °1 Therefore, federal
courts must abide by the Supreme Court's admonition to obey
congressional instructions. °2 Indeed, the constitutional basis of
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
Id. at 309.
I& at 310.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 315.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
2o 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
201 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
'2 But see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (finding violations of
Federal Water Pollution Control Act do not require injunction where other remedies
available, statutory scheme contemplated exercise of discretion and no support in legislative
history for denial, by Congress, of equitable discretion). One author advocates a narrow
reading of Weinberger because of the disposition of the case, the anomalous result if not read
in context of TVA and City of Milwaukee, and that "broad equitable discretion ... would
contravene congressional intent.* Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and
Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 513, 525-27 (1984). Farber contends that,
if Weinberger is given this narrow reading, the decisions support the proposition that courts
are "agents of Congress with a mandate to enforce congressional policy decisions.' Id. at 527.
Furthermore, he advocates analysis of the role injunctions play in a statutory scheme as the
primary guides for courts. Id. at 544.
Professor Schoenbrod would contend, however, that § 502(a) exemplifies legislation that
"fails to define explicitly the degree of equitable discretion permissible.' Daniel S.
Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balancing the Equities
and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REv. 627, 633 (1988). Through application of his
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federal copyright law underscores the need for federal courts to
honor congressional intent.2°8
Thus, in order for a court to issue an injunction under this
section, "a copyright" must be at issue. Also, for "a copyright" to be
at issue, the work must be fixed. Furthermore, for a court to have
jurisdiction over the infringement action in order to issue an
injunction, the work must be registered. °
Yet, courts that issue permanent injunctions to protect future
works ignore these commands. 2°s Even if an injunction could
issue for infringement of a copyright that is not the copyright at
proposed principle, he argues, courts will utilize equity to satisfy the law.
The injunction should require the defendant to achieve the plaintiff's
rightful position unless (a) different relief is consistent with the goals of
the violated rule and (b) the case involves a factor justifying departure
from the rule that was not reflected in its formulation, but the injunction
may never aim to achieve more than the plaintiffs rightful position.
Id. at 694.
Application of this principle invariably would lead to the cessation of future works
injunctions. By issuing an injunction to prohibit a defendant's infringement, a court will be
achieving the plaintiff's rightful position. A different result-a future works injunction-is
not consistent with the Copyright Act's limitation of federal statutory protection to fixed
works. Even though the potential for future infringement may present concerns not
contemplated by Congress, a future works injunction places a plaintiff in a better-than-
original position.
But see Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985) ("A copyright, like other
intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully delimited interests
to which the law affords correspondingly exact protections.'); see also Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,
210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) ('The copyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed with a
view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought not to be unduly extended
by judicial construction to include privileges not intended to be conferred... ').
, See, eg., International Trade Management v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402,403 (Cl.
Ct. 1982) ("Considerations of judicial economy raised by plaintiffs carry little weight where
jurisdiction is in issue. The court cannot assert jurisdiction ... simply because it considers
Congress' decision to withhold jurisdiction to be unwise or uneconomical... it is not for this
court to second-guess Congress .... ').
Professors Nimmer appear to agree with the issuance of injunctions to protect future
works:
Moreover, when there has been a history of continuing infringement of
a number of plaintiff's works and a significant threat of future infringe-
ment remains, a permanent injunction may even issue that applies not
only to the works as to which infringement has already been adjudicated,
but also to any other works presently owned by plaintiff, or any works
which may in the future be owned by the plaintiff.
3 NnDMna & NDMER, aupra note 141, § 14.06[B], at 14-100. Interestingly, this position on
injunctions against future works seems to contradict their position on copyrightability of
unfixed works, see supra note 172.
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issue in the action, the work must be copyrightable for a copyright
to exist at all. In this context, the work is not copyrightable
because it does not yet exist, and thus, cannot be fixed. It is
inconceivable that Congress intended, by granting discretion to the
courts, to permit protection by common law to that which it chose
not to protect statutorily.
C. STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
By virtue of the congressional monopoly over copyright, any effort
to remedy the problem posed by courts issuing injunctions to
protect future works must occur statutorily. A proposed revision of
section 502 is as follows:
(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action
arising under this title may, subject to the provisions
of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final
injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable
to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.
An injunction shall not issue to prevent or restrain
infringement of a work that is not fixed at the time
the infringement action is commenced.
Such a revision would prevent the issuance of injunctions to protect
future works and eliminate the burgeoning growth of federal
common-law copyright.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright in the United States has been a creature of statute.
As mandated by the Constitution and reinforced by the Supreme
Court in its first pronouncement on copyright law, the nature of
copyright as a limited statutory monopoly seemed unquestionable.
Despite the facial clarity of the statutory copyright protection
extended by Congress, over the past fourteen years a startling
development has occurred. Through the issuance of permanent
injunctions to protect future works, courts have created a federal
common-law copyright, antithetical to both the Constitution and
the Copyright Act of 1976. These courts have done that, which on
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the face of the statute, seems impossible. They have relied on the
statutory copyright protection embodied in the act to protect that
which the statute explicitly exempts from protection. These courts
extend copyright protection to works which are not copyrightable
because they do not exist, and, therefore, cannot be fixed. Taking
refuge in semantic gymnastics and platitudes of judicial economy,
the creation of federal common-law copyright threatens the limited
statutory monopoly-the foundation of American copyright law for
the past two hundred years. This creation of federal common-law
copyright has gone unchallenged. It must be challenged if this
foundation is to remain intact.
KRISmA ROSETTE
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